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Brigandage and Resistance in 
Lancastrian Normandy: A Study of 
the Remission Evidence * 
\1ichael R. Evans 
University of Reading 
The period of English conquest and occupation of Nonnandy (1415-50) 
saW a great deal of that social and economic di sruption so often 
associated with medieval warfare. The. aspect of this disruption to be 
investigated here is the occurence of brigandage and of resistance to 
English rule. These were the two main forms wh ich popular 
movements seem to have taken. There were outbreaks of open 
res istance, when the peasantry look up anns against the government, 
such as those in central Normandy in 1433-34, and in the Caux in 
1435-36, as weJl as smaJler outbreaks , such as the ri sing in 1424 
which foJlowed false reports of a French victory at the battle of 
VerneuiJ. Then there was the phenomenon of the ' brigands'. The 
nature of these armed bands, whose activities posed a major problem 
for the English authorities, has been the subject of some debate. 
centering on the question of whether they shou ld be viewed as rebels 
or bandits. This is a debate wh ich, in AJlmand's words, has usuaJly 
seen 'participants drawn up along nationallines'.l Nineteenth-century 
French historians, notably Lefevre-Pontalis, saw the brigands as 
patriots, 'tombes pour la France '.2 Puiseux, placed the ri sings of the 
1430s in the same context: 
Nulle nation n'a plus completement que la notre 
donne la demonstration de celie grande loi de 
I'humanite: c'est dans la lutte ... que la France a eu 
I'entiere revelation de son nationalite.3 
This type of writing was encouraged by the need to construct an heroic 
national history following France's humiliating defeat in the Franco-
..L 
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Prussian War. In 1901, Lefevre-Pontalis described the war as a'd 
gigantesque avec I 'insatiable Angleterre, pour 1 'independance de n Uti 
sol et Ie maintien de notre integrite nalionale ... '.4 The upshot of ~~~~ 
line of thought is that the brigands have been viewed as patriorl \ 
guerillas continuing the struggle 'behind enemy lines' Ie 
representatives of an emerging French nationalism. More rece~tt.\ 
historians such as Jouet have argued that the brigands' activities reve~; 
a large degree of anti-English motivation. 
The alternative view plays down the patriotic element of the 
brigands' activities, stressing their criminal nature, and the anti path} 
that often existed between them and the peasant population. The 
chronicler Thomas Basin recorded how the peasantry lived in fear of 
the brigands, who were one of the many threats to their livelihood 
alongside economic problems and the impact of war and pillage: 
Rowe, an English historian writing in the 1930s, saw the brigands as 
disturbers of the peace at a time of comparative prosperity. She shows 
that the government of the duke of Bedford treated them as common 
criminals rather than political opponents.5 
As well as 'patriotic' views of the brigands, there are possible 
economic explanations for their activities. They may be seen as 
peasants who were driven off their lands by hardship and by the attacks 
of both armies, and who tried to make from banditry the living they 
were unable to maintain on the land. In this view, their major 
motivation was self-preservation. In a Marxist framework, their 
actions might be seen as a rebellion against,. or rejection of, their 
exploited role as peasants in the feudal order. The Tuchins, to whom 
they could be compared, were reported to have have only attacked the 
rich, whom they identified by their uncalloused hands.' The 
phenomenon of socially-subversive robber bands has been called 
'social banditry' by Hobsbawm,' who argues that it offered an 
alternative existence for a small minority of peasants. Bandits were 
often accorded a hero status, and sometimes co-operated with rebel 
armies during revolutionary wars.8 
But who exactly were the brigands? There were, broadly speaking, 
three groups of people who disturbed the peace of Lancastrian 
Normandy. The group usually referred to as brigands were those 
bandits who resorted to the forest and attacked travellers and English 
soldiers. These were the brigandi of Basin's chronicle, who caused 
great difficulties for the English, but who equally 'allowed no peace 
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It , peasants or for anyone, who caused for so long that horrible lor t t; • , 9 
, lation of the regIOn. ~~, , 
, addition to these bngands, there were groups of freelance soldiers 
In (Ook part in pillaging. Their act ivilies were sim ilar in many 
.lto cIS to those of the brigands, and cases involving Eng lish pillagers 
rt."':- in the remissions which are used as the main basis of this study, 
~c of which were concerned with attacks by English soldiers on 
- 'veS This group should be di stinguished from the first if we are to 
nail . 
CJard the native ' bri gands' as a local peasant movement. However it 
7:::no l always easy to draw such a distinction, as Wright 's work on 
I 'd h h 10 fourteenth-centuryevi ence as sown. 
Finally there was also a difference between the brigands and the 
peasant rebels of 1434-36, To some exlent the ' patriotic' view of Ihe 
brigands relies upon playing down this difference, and placing both 
!!roups in a single category, as Jauet does when describing resistants 
in Normandy. In fact , there was often antagoni sm between the 
brigands and the settled peasant population , who did not welcome the 
disruption caused by brigandage, The ri sings of the 1430s began when 
Ihe peasantry was armed by the English ' to guard and defend 
Ihemselves .. , against the enemy, .. [and] against the brigands and 
English piliagers .. .'" 
Some, however, did support the brigand s; (here are many 
remissions for peasants who assisted them, while in one example, a 
dizainier (mi liti a leader) actually went over to the brigands. '2 
Nevertheless we do need to remember that not all peasants supported 
the brigands, and that for every peasant who joined or assisted them, 
many more probably wanted no more than to be allowed to till the 
land in peace, 
The evidence 
There are a number of sources which are useful in the study of 
resistance. The ev idence of chronicles sllch as those of Thomas Basin 
and Pierre Cachon is useful in providing us with a time framework 
inro which to fit the act ivi ties of the brigands and rebels, in describing 
thei r activities and giving us an idea of the attitudes of contemporaries 
towards them. We do, however, have to be aware of the problems of 
their subjectivity .13 
Of more use to a detailed study are the contemporary official 
government sources. Records of executions have been used for this 
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purpose , notably by Jouet in his study of resistance in Lowe 
Normandy" and by Gourlay in a s imilar study relating to Upper 
Normandy in the later years of the occupation. IS These records ar; 
useful but also have their limitations. They tell us the name of the 
brigand concerned. the place and method of execution, and the victim's 
place of origin. They do not reveal, however, the circumstances Or 
motives behind their crimes. or the age or occupation of the person 
executed. 
Some of the_se gaps can be filled using remission evidence. The 
principal primary source used in this article is the collection edited by 
Le Cacheux in 1907 of the remissions (concerning Normandy).issued 
by the English government in Paris. 16 This edition covers remissions 
from the years 1423 to 1435. These were issued by the government to 
petitioners seeking pardons for crimes that they or members of their 
family had committed. They are particularly interesting for the light 
they throw upon the circumstances surrounding individual crimes, and 
can also help give us a flavour of the nature of the society with which 
they were concerned. In each remission the version of events as told by 
the petitioner is set forth , so that we have a val uable, albeit one-sided, 
account of the types of offence committed. It is also common for the 
remission to include the occupation and age of the petitioner. They can 
also tell us about others who did not seek remi sion, but who are 
mentioned by the petitioner. For example, those involved in a brigand 
action with the petitioner, or people who had attacked the pelitionerY 
Le Cacheux included 246 remissions. Of these, 49 concern overt 
brigandage. This is not to say that all these were for actual brigands; 
in this category have been included all those who assisted the brigands, 
voluntarily or otherwise. These are remissions where the tenn 'brigand' 
is specifically used. As will be explained, however, there are great 
problems surrounding the definition of a brigand, so this figure should 
be viewed as an approximation. A furth e r 76 remi ssions concern 
people who may be seen as acting against the English - by attacking 
individual Englishmen, by helping the French armies, or by fleein g 
English-controlled territory. Again, it must be stressed that these were 
not all necessarily acting out of patriotism, especially the last group, 
who might have fled to escape the war, and who by returning to seek a 
remiss ion were in effect accepting English authority. However, these 
figures can give us a rough idea of the extent to which brigandage and 
anti-English activity were of concern to the authorities. The large 
number of remissions for non-political crimes remind us that this was 
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ciety where the violent settling of disputes was commonplace. 
J.Ij~tS between natives and English soldiers may prove, on closer 
~Ig eetion, to have no obvious political or racial motive. For 
In')~ple, one remission concerns two Englishmen who had attacked a 
e'(~dsmith in an argument over a ring that he claimed they had stolen 
ir~m him. IS In this and in similar remissions no political motive is 
mentioned. 
The very nature of the remissions, however, means that they must 
be handled with care as evidence. They gave the version of events as 
wid by the petitioner, so might be deliberately misleading about the 
motive behind a crime, as the petitioner tried to present him- or herself 
in the best light. Political motives may have been disguised as 
personal disputes, as the person seeking the remission may not have 
wanted to give the English reason to doubt his or her loyalty. The 
mysterious brigands could sometimes be blamed for murders in cases 
which sound suspiciously like attempts to cover up a murder 
committed by the petitioner, as in the case cited by Jouet of a man 
who failed to report the killing of two women by the brigands." The 
brigands could be convenient scapegoats. Some murderers tried to 
mitigate their actions by claiming their victim was a brigand20 while 
many who helped the brigands claimed to have been coerced." 
The overall picture given by the evidence of the remi ssions should 
also be treated with care, as the policy behind the issuing of 
remissions could distort the sample. The remissions that were recorded 
are successful ones. More serious crimes leading to executions would 
not appear in the sample. A lenient government might be more likely 
to grant remissions than a harsh one, and a strong government might 
be more willing to grant remissions than a weak one, because it felt 
fairly secure. On the other hand, of course, a large number of 
remissions may indicate a weak. government trying to buy support, 
although this does not seem to be the case in this study. The English 
government which issued these remiss ions was in a fairly secure 
position for much of this period , due to its military success. For 
example, after the battle of Verneuil, the government was in a strong 
position and granted remissions to many who had joined the rising 
against the English at the time of the battle. Hence the townspeople of 
Verneuil were granted a remission on the very morrow of the battle for 
their part in the rising, the remission being 'Donne en notre ost devant 
Vemeuil' n The authority of the English government was indisputable 
- for the time being - after this victory. We can find numerous 
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examples of people w.ho returned to English obedience in this periOd 
Seven remissions issued between (he baule of Verneuil (18 AUguSt) 
and the end of the year 1424 relate to people who had been in th 
French army, or in Valois-controlled territory, and who had no; 
returned to seek mercy.23 The large number of remissions issued in 
1424 (37 relating to brigandage or resistance to the English) reflects 
not only the outbreak of violence against the English at the time of 
the battle of Vemeuil, but also the security which that victory gave to 
the government of Bedford. The fortunes of war affected the likelihOOd 
of people to seek remissions, as is shown by the case of Perrot 
Amiot.24 He joined the French armies after they had captured Louviers 
in 1429, but sought and obtained a remission from the English 
besieging that same town in July 1431. His example may be typical 
of the many who tried to survive in uncertain times by attempting to 
apppear loyal to whichever king had the upper hand. 
Finally, two more caveats must be mentioned. One is the time lag 
whereby the year of the remission is not necessarily the year when the 
action in question was commined, so that, for example, a man who 
helped the French to enter Sees in 1421 returned to seek a remission 
six years later. This must be borne in mind especially for crimes such 
as these, that occurred before the series of remissions began in January 
1423. The second is to be aware that the people who gained 
remissions were more likely to be from the rank and file than from the 
leadership of rebel or brigand groups. The leaders were more likely to 
face execution, as the government could not risk allowing them to go 
free and resume their activities. 
Chronology 
This study concentrates more on the social origins of the resistants 
and their motivation (where this can be inferred from the remissions) 
than on the geography or chronology of brigandage and resistance. The 
remissions are particularly useful in giving the occupation of the 
person involved, and in giving us some idea as to possible motives, 
so these areas are worth concentrating on. The geographical spread 
could be worked out from the remissions, but there is not really room 
in this study to go into great detail on this aspect, which has already 
been studied by Jouet and Goulay. A brief chronology based upon the 
remission evidence. and on the list of executions in Lower Normandy 
collected by Jouet." will however, be mapped out. These have been 
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ped by year in Figure I. They provide a very rough idea of the ,roll d . 
- "dence of brigandage an resistance. 
'OC~he large number of remi ssions from 1424 is striking. As we have 
this reflects both the number of attacks on the English at the 
,,,,n'of Verneuil and the conciliatry policies that Bedford could afford 1I~~plernen( in its wake. The relatively high level of remissions in 
t~e years following 1424 could also reflect policy, as people returned 
I Of accepted. English rule. However, the execution figures show 
~ .' . hal the ris ings In 1424 were treated as a scnous threat by the 
:uthOrities. This year is the highest point for both sets of fi gures. The 
I!overnment's concern was shown by its actions to deal with the 
problem. Measures to repress the brigands were included as ordinances 
in December 1423 and January 1424." The problem did not end with 
the victory at Vemeuil; in September 1426, new measures were taken 
10 protect the roads against me brigands. following a complaint to the 
Grand Conseil in Pari s. 27 It is possible that the incidence of 
brigandage after 1424 was due to more people turning to brigand-like 
methOds to resist the English, as it was harder to do so openly; Basin 
claimed that after the battle of Vemeuil , many became brigands 'either 
OUl of cowardice or out of hatred of the English'.211 
The execution records show another high point in 1436. This was 
the year in which the great peasant rising in the Caux was defeated, 
which no doubt accounts for the large number of executions. As 
louet's study only covers Lower Normandy, these figures probably 
under-estimate the actual level of resistance, which was centred on 
Upper Normandy. In the devastation following the rebellion , both 
brigands and pillagers from the armies seem to h·ave thrived; Basin 
wrote that soldiers 'got into the habit ... of pillaging and exploiting, 
in disgui se. the users of the publi c roads. 29 In response to this, 
'numerous brigands and highwaymen laid ambushes for the English 
and killed them without pity'.'· Interestingly, Goulay shows that the 
Caux was not a major centre of brigand activity after this time, 
perhaps becau se English repression was effective, or because the 
presence of armies (the French army captured some important towns 
during the rebellion) limited the scope for brigandage. 
We can therefore suggest a broad outline for the hi story or 
brigandage and resistance in this period. The large numbers of 
executions in 1419-20 suggest a high level of resistance associated 
with the English conquest, when Henry V's new subjects were 
expected to take an oath of loyalty to him, and the brigandage reported 
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by Basin at the beginning of the 1420s associated with the dim 
economic situation. Resistance flared up around the time of the blCl.I1I 
of Verneuil, and is reflected in both the remiss ion and execuall~ 
records. There is quite a high level of executions in 14291~"" 
associated perhaps with improving French fortunes in the war after O. 
siege of Orleans. After this, there seems to be a period of relative C~I: 
before the revolts of the mid 1430s. 
The social origins of brigands and resistants 
Were the brigands, and those who came into conflict with English 
rule, representatives of genuinely popular movements? Puiseux argued 
that the impetus for the rebellions against English rule came from the 
lower classes.3l A Marxist explanation of brigandage as a response to 
social crisis would likewise argue for plebian origins for those 
involved. Do the facts ~onfirm these views? The execution evidence 
used by Jouet does not provide details of the social status of those 
involved. The remissions are much more helpful on the issues of 
occupation and social standing. Of the 125 people who were involved 
with the brigands, or who in some way opposed the English, 115 are 
referred to by occupation. These can be summarised as follows: 
Table I: Summary of social origins 
Occupation or class No. of remissions % of sampJe32 
Labourers 50 43 
Shop-keepers, craftsmen, 27 23 
merchants etc. 
Clergy 7 6 
Esquires (teuyers) 5 4 
Povres hommes 8 7 
Crown officials 5 4 
Fishhermen 4 3 
Women 3 3 
Gaolers (helped escapers) 2 2 
Gentry I I 
Others 3 3 
Total ill 22 
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According to these figures,. the overwhelming majority of those 
vo lved were from the lower classes We should bear in mind, :wever, the possibility that the poorer offenders were more likely to 
pardoned than the members of the gentry and nobility who opposed :e English and who might be able to use their social Slatus to draw 
upport for Charles VII. Nevertheless, the figures do suggest that the 
, aJ'ority of those involved were agricultural workers, or craftsmen and 
m f . 
,mall traders. These groups represent the lower levels 0 society, but 
not the lowest stratum of the landless dispossessed workers. All but 
fou r of the labourers desc ribe themselves specifically as pOl' re 
laboureuf'. The claim to poverty should not perhaps be taken literally, 
as it is so common to have the appearance of a formula, especially as 
the petitioners always seem to strive to gain the sympathy of the 
authorities, by stress ing the ir poverty or the fact that they had 
dependents. It is undeniable, however, that the fi g ures suggest activity 
mainly from below. 
Many of the peasants are referred to as laboureur de bras'. This may 
imply that they came from the lower sections of the peasantry, the 
manual workers with little land who might have to sell their labour to 
the richer peasants. The word laboureur usually refers to specificall y to 
a tiller of the soil or a plouglunan. They were distinct from the better-
off peasant, the manouvrier .33 Thi s latter description is not used by 
any peasant seeking a remission. Is there any significance in this fact? 
The laboureur would represent one of the sections of society worst 
affected by the disturbance of war, because they were the group (apart 
from the complete ly landless worker) nearest to subsistence level. 
Their prominence could, of course, simply be because they were the 
most numerous section of society. Bois calculates that in Aliermont 
in Eastern Normandy in the period 1397 to 1424,48% of the tenants 
(66 of 135) owned less than 6 hectares , or less than what seems 
indispensable to maintain a family on land of average fertilit y.34 In the 
social crisis produced by war, these people might be the most likely to 
take up a life of brigandage because they had the least to lose. On the 
other hand, Bois believes that it was not actually the poorest people 
who fled during the crisis years of 141 7-22, but rather the better-off 
peasants who had their livelihoods disrupted by war and brigandage. '" 
Let us look at some of the remi ssions relating 10 people who fled 
English authority through poverty. One Robin Auber fl ed in 1423, 
and returned to seek a remission the following year..l6 He was a small 
trader and worker, 'vivant de marchandise et de labour'37 who had been 
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unable to pay his debts to an English captain after some herrin 
had bought were SlOlen by the brigands. To avoid the wrath ;r'IIt 
English creditor, he fled to the woods and joined a group of sold hi 
'tenans nostre parti contraire'.38 Iehan Auvre, 'povre homme labou let 
received a remission in 1424.39 He had refused to pay the moulte t~e~r 
lord, and had hi s goods seized by the local pnival, whereupon Jeh " 
fled to 'noz ennemis et adverseres' at the garrison of Ste-Suzanne an 
Maine.40 Another example of a person fleeing through poverty win 
Jehan Cauchon • a 'jeune simple homme' who was (so he Claime~\ 
forced to supply arms to the brigands, and fl ed to Brittany after th: 
English seized his goods by way of punishment." These were 
examples of men of modest means, but of some small property, who 
were driven into poverty by circumstances, and who later returned to 
gain remissions. 
Most of the supplicants in the remissions represent the 'rank and 
file' of the brigands, telling us little about the social origins of the 
leaders, who were perhaps more likely to face execution. However, a 
group of remissions suggest that at least some of the leaders 
themselves belonged to the lower classes. In October 1424, a 'povre 
homme laboureur' named Guillaume Halley gained a remission for 
having supplied provisions for his son, also called Guillaume Halley, 
who three years earlier had joined 'noz ennemis et adversaires'.42 The 
younger Halley was captured by the English, but escaped and 's'en ala 
du tout rendre avec les briganz.'43 Two years later , in March 1426, 
Guillaume de la Haye, 'povre homme laboureur de bras'44 was granted a 
remission for having supplied lances to 'ung brigant nome Guillaume 
Hallay.''' Young Halley, if this is the same man, was now a brigand 
of some repute, 'accompagne de deux ou trois de ses complices'.46 In 
May of 1426 Guillaume Bouchier povre homme laboureur'" received a 
remission afler helping 'Guillaume Halle, brigant, et pluseurs aulres de 
sa Compaignie .. .'.48 Guillaume Halle appears in the remission of 
Laurens Hue, 'povre varlet cordouennier'49 who had also joined his 
band of 'xv ou xvj compaignons brigands'.50 Jeannin Beaudouyin . a 
tanner, also received a remission in May 1426 for his part in this 
band." The group of compaignons probably perished at this time, 
judging by the flurry of remissions given to its members, suggesting 
that they were no longer seen as a threat. Bouchier and Beaudouyin 
were captured in a raid on the abbey of Preaux. Together, these 
remissions form a 'case history' of a brigand , who, having fled English 
justice, gathered a small band of armed men around him who engaged 
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·ds In this example, both the leader and his companions seem to ,n~ . ..
e been drawn from the peasantry. They mIght have been ex-soldIers haY 
tling their military talents to another use, as was the case for Hallay 
P"ho had served with a French garrison . 
w . 
Brigandage seems to have also appealed to the poor or dISpossessed, 
presented in the remissions by those describing themselves as povre 
:)mmes. In the remission given to Jehan Ie Senechal in 1425,52 there 
is a reference to 'pluseurs brigans et autres povres gens de petit estat.' 53 
This suggests that many brigands came from the ranks of the poor, 
and that brigans and povres gens may have been associated in the 
minds of the better-off (Jehan Ie Senechal was an esquire). Other 
marginal groups may have been attracted to resistance. Guillaume 
Byam, 'soubzaage et orphelin'" was among a group who attacked the 
residence of the English captain at Pont-Audemer at (he time of the 
baUle of Vemeui!. Rebellion probably had a greater appeal among the 
young; of 63 remissions where the petitioners age is mentioned eight 
related to men under 20 (including one fourteen-year-old), and another 
17 to the 20-24 age range. Older people are mentioned as well (there 
are sixteen over 35) but often are not directly involved, such as 
Hallay's father." 
Before proceeding, it is important to draw a di sti nction (where 
possible) between bri gands and those who were involved in anti-
English activities but were not associated with the brigands. Of our 
sample of 115 for whom the occupation is known , some 22 do not 
seem to have been involved in identifiably political actions, for 
instance those involved in personal quarrels which happened to involve 
Englishmen, and those who fled to French territory but did not 
actively oppose the English. This leaves 35 who were brigands or who 
assisted brigands, and 58 who opposed the English, either through pre-
meditated aHacks on English soldiers, or by collaborating with the 
Valois armies. The social break-down of these two groups is shown in 
Table 2. 
These figures suggest two interesting facts. Firstly, the level of 
peasant involvment is high in both sets of figures. Secondly, there is 
a slight, but nonetheless striking, skew in favour of the better-off in 
the second set of figures. Brigandage seems to have been a movement 
of the lower classes. Higher sections of society appear to have been 
involved in more 'political' actions. Examples of the latter can be seen 
in the remi ssions relating to a plot to surrender Rouen to the French 
in 142456 which involve two masons and a merchant, and in the single 
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remission for a genli/homme. Colin Ie Baillant, who had served 
French army after the battle of Verneuil." He was, perh the 
significantly, only a 'pavre gentilz homs'.58 Possibly a similar cas:P\ 
an impoverished gentleman may be found in the remission for Gilet ~f 
Lointren 'pavre homme extrait de noble ligne' who had fought in the 
French armies, and was only saved from execution by a young wOOl
a 
C' 
who promised to marry himP9 Churchmen and ecuyers were almo~ 
exclusively involved in pro~ French rather than brigand activities. The 
exceptions claimed to have been coercecLIiO 
Table 2: Social origins of brigands and rebels 
Brigands Rebels 
Occugation or class Number T!2 Number % 
Laboureurs 19 54 27 45 
Shopkeepers etc. 7 20 14 24 
Clergy 3 5 9 
Esquires I 3 3 5 
'Povres homrnes 2 6 3 5 
Officials 0 0 2 3 
Fishennen 2 6 2 
Women 2 6 2 
Gentry 0 0 2 
Others 3 2 
Total ~ ill 58 99 
The different social patterns can be interpreted in two ways. Firstly, 
it could be seen as a town-country divide. Gourlay observed that in 
Upper Normandy the towns were probably nol centres of aClive 
brigandage, which by its very nature was best carried out in remole 
rural areas, particularly forests. b' Plots against the English, however, 
were very often centred on a town, as these were of great importance 
strategically. Control of a key town such as Rouen or Harfleur meant 
control of the surrounding area. Hence sympathisers of Charles Vll 
might plot to tum the town over to the French armies. Remissions 
can be found relating lo such plots in Sees (1421),62 Rouen (1424),63 
and Etrepagny (1429)" These very often involved fairly rich members 
of the bourgeoisie, such as the masons and the merchant involved in 
the Rouen plot. The second of the categories in Table 2 (shopkeeper, 
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n merchants) would be more concentrated in the towns. 
lI,rnehe'se people were involved with the brigands, they are more 
~~( . 
" be small traders; we fmd a barber surgeon, a merchant, two 
I) to ( an apprentice shoe-maker, a butcher and a brewer. Most of 
I1ne~'ould have been part of the peasant village community, sharing 
. ..e W . ,~ '[af origins with the labourers. 
;he second difference is one of social circumstance. The richer 
nS of the population would have little reason to join or co-
.(CliO 
'Ite with the brigands, To men of property, the brigands would lper. 
~e appeared as a threat to their wealth, particularly to the merchants, 
:hO suffered the risk of brigand attacks on the road. The upper classes 
auld also be more poittlcally aware than the peasantry, as they 
;presented th~ political nation which took part in meetin?s of (he 
Estates, in which the peasants were not represented. ThIS would 
re,umably have made them more likely than the peasantry to take up p . 
a political stance. 
II is still true, however, that a large number of peasants were 
Involved in attacks on the English, The great revolts of the mid-
1 430s, which unfortunately are not covered by the remissions, seem to 
have been led by the common people, Basin described those involved 
as peasants; agrorum cu/tores,65 popularium rusticorurn66 and so on. 
What is particularly interesting is that there emerged a distrust between 
the peasantry and the regular French anny in the Caux, When the anny 
refused to attack Caudebec, the peasants questioned its commitment to 
the struggle; 'vous estes traistres, nous y voulons aller .'61 The army 
commanders 
were jealous of the people for having initiated the 
undertaking so well, falsely and criminally professing that 
this would be a great danger for themselves and for the 
the kingdom of France if these populations were fortunate 
enough to drive the English from the country by their own 
efforts ... . 68 
These div isions led to the defeat and destruction of the peasant bands 
by the English army, This was not the first time that French forces 
had put the interests of their class first; during the Jacquerie, Navarrese 
and royal armies had made common cause against the rebels. The 
ringing of church bells, which had been used by the Ja cques to 
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summon their forces. was banned by Charles V. even when s 
the alarm against English soldiers.69 OUlldu'l 
The organisation of the Nonnan rebels shared th is feature . 
with ,,,-
Jacques. In 1434 the English government , worried by the probl •• 
caused by brigands and pillages from both armies, began to a ''''' 
peasants. A system of community defence was organised und': tht 
leadership of dizainiers, respected village leaders 'around wh u.. 
everyone had to meet when the bells sounded, and under wh ""' 
command they had to march. '70 In effect, the authorities were reviv~ 
a previous practice of peasants arming themselves in self-defen;g 
Wright describes how throughout the Hundred Years War peasants h~ 
taken defensive measures against marauding armies, such as fortifyin 
the local church or sounding bells to gather the men of the Village' 
Such organisation could be turned against the government a 
, \ 
happened in the Jacquerie and in the Norman peasant risings. It could 
also provide the basis for brigand leadership; in 1426 we find a 
dizainier Richart Chelloe, 'povre hom me laboureur', going over to the 
side of the brigands, although he did claim to have been coerced." 
Such claims could , of course, have been made to cover up genuine 
sympathy for the brigands. 
The remissions are useful in covering one outbreak of violence 
agai nst the English authorities, namely the ri sing that was sparked-off 
by reports of a French victory at Verneuil. Nine remissions relate 
directly to thi s incident, and give the impression of a spontaneolls 
popular uprising. One remission was for a smith who had fought on 
the French side72 and another for the 'povre gentilz horns' who joined 
the French after the battle.73 The other seven remissions are for attacks 
on English soldiers, or their property. Two of these are collective. for 
the town of Verneuil which opened its gates to the French,74 and to a 
group of 38 's imples gens de village' who took up arms against the 
English.75 Of the recipients of the individual remissions, two were 
laboureurs,76 one a poor orphan,77 one a shoemaker,78 suggesting once 
again a popular movement. The exception is a remission for an eeuyer 
who was accused of siding with the brigands.19 
Resistance to authority seems, therefore, to have been a genuine 
popular movement. Little resistance within Normandy came from the 
nobility: some Nonnan nobles gave their loyalty to Henry V after the 
conquest, and many fought for the English government at Orleans.8o 
The choice offered them was to give their loyalty to Henry V or to 
forfeit their lands. Those who chose to support Charles VII could only 
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r<aJly do so by leaving Normandy. This was the case, for example, of 
Robert Carrouges, a lord from the Cotent," , who fought for Charles at 
Verneuil, and had his lands and property confiscated" Forfeit lands 
ould be given to Engli sh colonists, or to Frenchmen loyal to the 
~enrys. Thus Normandy was left with a nobility many of whom had 
n interest in the continuation of English life. a 
Similarly, the towns did not offer a great deal of resistance to the 
Engli sh. Henry V made examples of Harfleur and Caen for daring to 
resist him, after which most towns surrendered, and subsequently 
remained loyal, or at least acquiescent. The examples of urban 
resistance in the remissions coincide with the presence of a French 
army near the town in question. These plots might represent only a 
minority, who were loyal to Charles VII, or who simply hoped 10 
save the town from a damaging siege by the French army. The towns 
fonned an important e lement of the Norman Estates, which regularly 
voted large sums in taxes to the Lancastrian government. For 
example, the meeting in 1443 saw 21 towns represented, with 
townsmen constituting a majority of the membership of Estates.82 
There were no full -scale urban revolts in this period, no equivalent 
of the Hare/Ie of 1382. The towns remained remarkably quiescent. 
Many benefited from the brief economic recovery enjoyed under 
Bedford's rule, and English rule opened up the possibility of increased 
cross·Channel trade. In addition , the towns had been centres of 
Burgundian sympathy. Supporters of the duke of Burgundy had been 
involved in the Cabochien movement in Paris in 1413, and the capital 
remained Burgundian in sympathy. The bourgeoi sie feared the 
disruption of their towns and trade above all else, and were generally 
happy to accept the rule of anybody who could provide stability. 
The clergy were also generally loyal to the English. Some lower 
clergy refused to accept Lancastrian rule, and it is this section, the 
ordinary monks and priests, who appear in the remissions records. 
Some clergy who refused to accept Henry V were deprived of their 
benefices, and replaced by priests loyal to him. However, the upper 
echelons of the Church largely accepted English rule. 
Therefore resistance appears to have come mainly from the lower 
classes, although possibly more from men with some land or property 
than from the absolutely disposessed. While the gentry, bourgeoisie 
and higher clergy gave their support to the English , and voted taxes for 
the government, it was among the peasantry that this rule was most 
often challenged. Was this a patriotic resistance movement, however? 
US Evans 
Were rebels and brigands motivated by patriotism, loyalty to Chari 
VII, or by the defence of their own immediate economic interests? es 
Loyalty or resistance? 
Were the brigands patriots? Let us begin by looking at how the 
were regarded by the English authorities. The term 'brigand' eXiSle~ 
before 1415, and was used to describe the bandits and robbers who 
appeared in Normandy during the civi l war before Henry V's invasion 
Jouet argues that the term was applied to those who failed to swea~ 
allegiance to Henry V following the proclamation of February 1418 
and that brigands and partisans were synonymous in the eyes of th~ 
authorities; 'Ie "Brigand", dans 1a bouche d'Henri, c'est done celui qui 
tient Ie paTti de la France'.83 Descriptions such as 'armignacs et 
brigans'84 were often used in official documents, reinforcing this view. 
The treatment of executeq brigands also suggests a political element in 
their actions. In many executions they were treated as both traitors alld 
bandits; for example, Jouet cites the execution in 1431 of 'deux 
traltres, brigans, ennemis et adversaires du Roy' who were 'decappites 
com me traltres et les corps pendus au gibet comme larrons.'85 The 
brigands were therefore seen by the English authorities as common 
criminals by virtue of their actions, but as traitors because they 
resisted the king. 
However, an a lternative view is equally valid. If, as Jouet suggests, 
true partisans were associated with bandits in order to discredi t them, 
does this not suggest the existence of large numbers of 'brigands' who 
were not politically motivated? Furthermore, brigands were treated 
differently from soldiers - as criminals, not pri soners -of-war. 
Following an ordinance of 1419, anyone capturing a brigand was to 
turn him over to the authorities , in exchange for a reward of six Iivres 
tournois. In order to prevent the brigand resuming his activities, the 
practice of accepting a ransom for a captured brigand was actively 
discouraged.86 The treatment of brigands as traitors does not necessari ly 
mean that they were partisans; under Norman law, which Henry V 
respected in order to appeal to regional loyalty to him as 'duke', 
highway robbery was considered an offence against the duke. Thus the 
description of brigands as 'ennemis et adversaires' may not imply 
political opposition, although admittedly they are described as enemies 
of the king, not of the duke. 
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Does the evidence of the remi ssions clarify the position? Of the 53 
'ssions relating directly to brigand activities, 14 describe the 
renll . 
. nods in terms that see them as enemies of the king. A number use 
bng· h . 'b . . d d ' 87 nations of t e expressions ngans, cnnemlS et a verseres e oous . 
~ne remi ssion refers to 'brigans et autres tenans Ie parti de noz 
.dversaires'.88 In this example, it is clearly suggested that the brigands 
:ere partisans of Charles VII. Similarly. a remission describes people 
who 'renoient Ie parti contarairc a nous, et estoient brigans'.89 Tn the 
remission of Guillaume Ie Mire, one Roger Christof]c is described as 
having 'se feust ale rendre brigant , adherant. complice et alie des 
ennemis et adverseres de nostredit feu pere (Henry V) et de nous (Henry 
VI)'.'" 
However, the majority of these remissions do not use such terms. 
In most we simply read about 'brigants' or 'brigans', as if this 
designation were self-explanatory. They were often described as robbers 
or criminals: 'larrons brigans',91 'mauvais et crueulx brigans',n 'brigan 
el Jarron ... mal faicteur et commiteur des crimes'.93 Colin Ie Rat, a 
noted brigand leader, was described contemptuously as a 'Iarron et 
brigant '.94 Sometimes the two roles overlap, as when they were 
described as 'Iarrons brigans, nos ennemis et adverseres'.95 
Was patriotism a motive for these brigands? Again the evidence is 
contradictory. Thomas Basin was sceptical about their patriotism, 
saying that men became brigands 'whether out of cowardice, or out of 
hatred for the English', for personal gain , or to flee justice.96 This 
seems a fair reflection of the remission evidence. Brigands did direct 
their attacks again st the English and officials. A brigand named 
Arnault FelOt was summarily hanged by an Englishman in 1426 in 
revenge for having killed an esq uire from the English garrison of 
Chateau Gaillard." Robin Castellain was implicated in the killing in 
1425 of a tax-collector and a sergeant" It is difficult to see any 
organised resistance movement behind these isolated attacks, however. 
The anack by a band of brigands on Engli sh soldiers fl eeing the bamle 
of Vemeuil may have been an organised act of resistance, but was just 
as likely to have been an opportunist attack on a vulnerable targel.99 
Many peasants apparently unconnected with the brigands or partisans 
carried out similar attacks. 
Some remissions suggest links between the brigands and French 
royal annies. A few men who fled the English to 'enemy' temitory. or 
who fought in the French armies, later reappeared as brigands. 
Guillaume Hallay (or Halle), a 'capitaine des brig.ns ', served 'noz 
120 Evans 
ennemis et adversaires'·at the garrison of Nogent Ie Retrou.1oo Af 
being captured by the English, he escaped and joined the brigans J ler 
" . . ean de Pavee, who. was accused of helpmg a band of ennemis (French 
soldIers or partISans?), absconded and Jomed the bngands in the WOOd 
of Andely.IOI 
Some joined the brigands to escape English rule, or to avoid bein 
brought to justice for vario.us offences. Jehan Robert left his home an~ 
joined the brigands to escape his personal enemies and 'aucuns 
Anglois'. W2 Of course, in cases like this it may have been in the ex_ 
brigand's interest to deny a political motive. Pierre Cauchon claimed 
to have been forced to help the brigands, and was caught by Ihe 
English in the act of supplying them with arms. In order to. escape 
justice, he ned to enemy territory. 103 lehanninot Mestier claimed 10 
have fled to English rule because he had become involved in a quarrel 
over a woman with members of the English garrison of 
Eu P04However, after having Qed to Picardy he reappeared as a member 
of a band of brigands. There may have been some political motivation 
behind his band's attack on 'pluseurs marchans anglois '.''' although 
merchants would of course have offered considerable material rewards 
for robbery. 
So there seems to have been at least a degree of anti-English 
sentiment in brigand activity. However, most of the actions mentioned 
in the remissions were directed against non-political targets, including 
peasants. Many peasants granted remiss ions claimed to have been 
forced to help the brigands; we should be sceptical about some of these 
claims, which might be made to mitigate the petitioner's crimes. 
Nonetheless, we do gain an impression that peasants or other ordinary 
people formed the majority of the brigands' victims. For example, a 
fishmo.nger who fled English jurisdictio.n claimed to have done so after 
his stock had been stolen by the brigands. 106 Co.lin Michel, a peasant, 
had his home attacked and robbed by the brigands in 1423, and was too 
scared of reprisals to inform the authorities immediately. lo7 Etienne 
Fessart, 'povre homme laboureur'. was captured and held to ransom, by 
brigands. \08 A number of similar incidents show the extent to which 
the brigands preyed upon the local peasant population. 
There was, however, anti -Engli sh activity which was not 
apparently linked to the brigands. This took on several fonns, such as 
joining or assisting the annies of Charles VII wo.rking against the 
English within 'occupied ' Normandy, or o.pen revolt against the 
occupier. 
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111 Ihe first of these categories,"we find a number of cases where 
. n11ans gave assistance to the French armies. Some people took the 
\°pOrtunity to desert to Charles VII when it arose, such as those who 
op {over to the French side at or around the time of the battle of 
~e~euil. As we have seen, brigandage and anti-English activity seem 
ehave increased around the time of French military incursions: high 
{O ints occur in 1424 (Vemeuil), 1429-30 (the aftennath of the siege of ~Ieans and French advances in the Seine Valley) and 1436 (the Caux 
ris ing and French advances into Upper Normandy). If any Normans 
living under English rule sympathised with Charles VII , they would 
be more likely to show it at times of French military strength. 
Two remissions throw light on one case of defection. Jehan de 
Monnier received a remission in November 1424 for helping to sell 
{he goods of his lord, Robert de Carrouges, who had gone over to the 
French side. '09 Carrouges had been, in the words of Le Cacheux, 'un 
des premiers siegneurs normands qui s.e rallierent au paTti anglais.' llo 
He defected to the cause of Charles VII in 1424, and had his property 
confiscated in June of that year in favour of an English captain. He 
clearly wanted to salvage some of his livelihood by sending his clerk, 
Ie Monnier, to sell his goods before the English could enjoy their full 
benefit. Carrouges' actions suggest that he, like many others, accepted 
Henry V's rule when the English gained control of Normandy, but 
showed his loyalty to the Valois cause when French armies reappeared 
in {he Duchy. 
When a lord changed sides, many of his tenants and servants might 
do likewise out of loyalty to him rather than to either king. Thus we 
find that a farrier Jehan Lebret, 'povre homme ouvrier', served hi s 
master, the same Robert de Carrouges, at the battle of Verneuil, where 
Carrouges was killed. II I Lebret would understandably play down any 
partisan sympathies he may have had when seeking a remission , but it 
is nonetheless interesting to read the reasons he gave for his actions. 
He claimed to have followed C"rrouges without knowing that the 
latter planned to join the French anny. Carrouges had said that 'il me 
esconvient tres bref aler ou pais de Costentin veoir mes hornrnes et 
savoir comme mes terres ... sont gouvernees, 11 2 and needed Lebret to 
shoe his horses. The farrier went 'pour doubte d'encourir son 
(Carrouges's) indignation'"' rather than out of sympathy for the Valois 
cause. After the English victory at Verneuil, Lehret returned to seek a 
remission. 
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Others who joined the French armies claimed to have been forced 
do 50. 114 These examples are remini scent of s imilar cases wh to 
brigands coerced people into assisting them. In some instance er~ 
s. III 
fact , there does not seem to have been a great deal of differen 
between the actions of soldiers and those of brigands. Pierre AvenalCt 
labourer. received a remission in 1426 for his part in assisting so~ a 
French soldiers from the garrison of La Ferte Bernard who operated i e 
the woods of St-Evroult. 115 Their behaviour in haunting the forest an~ 
auacking the petitIOner's home was sim ilar to that of brigands. 
What form did resistance to the English occupation in Normandy 
take? As we have seen, anti-English feeling seems to have played at 
least a part in the activities of the brigands. These, although probably 
not synonymous with partisans, could be seen as embodying peasant 
resistance of a sort. However, they tended to operate on the edges of 
society, in the forests and wild places, and did not fonn an integral pan 
of peasant society. Goulay. found that brigandage tended to flouriSh in 
marginal areas,often where authority was weak. " 6 More economically 
advanced areas, such as the Seine Valley, where the peasant population 
was more concentrated and comparatively prosperous, did nOl have a 
high level of brigandage. 'l7 This is not to say, however, that the 
brigands were entirely separate from the community; there are Some 
examples of peasants who assisted relatives among the brigands, as we 
have seen in the case of Hallay, and of Colin Ie Rat, who received aid 
from an uncle. '18 The brigand was linked to, but operated outside, 
peasant society. The brigands should perhaps be seen as 'social bandits' 
who were 'small groups of men living on the margins of peasant 
society , and whose activities are considered criminal by the prevailing 
official power-structure and value-system, but not (or not without 
strong qualifications) by the peasantry'. "' 
Among the peasant population itself, self-defence seems to have 
been the major motive for conflict with the English. Many examples 
of killings of Englishmen by peasants ocurred when the latter came 
under attack, usually by pillards from the English army. In the 
remissions, out of 26 offences involving an attack on an Englishman 
or members of the English garrisons, the petitioner claimed to have 
been acting in se lf-defence on 15 occasions. To take but one example, 
louhan Daboviile, laboureur, received a remission for having killed an 
Englishman who attacked his home. He was assisted in this action by 
three other villagers. '2o It was often the case that small groups of 
peasants co-operated in this way in self-defence, as when the people of 
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serjoU took up ar~s against a band of pillagers, 'gens d'armes 
viois et autres ... ,121 from the anny of the earl of WarwIck. 
.>.nit is debatable whether such actions could be considered 'patriotic' 
.clS of resistance. It would probably be more accurate to describe them 
~!) defensive acts, protecting the peasant community against those, 
~ngliSh Of otherwise, who threatened it - as we have just seen, 
illagerS cou ld be 'anglois et autres.' lehan Ie Bouchier of Bernouville 
;n south-east Normandy fought in the Burgundian army, and later took 
art in a series of robberies in the company of a group of English ~illagers. 122 Jehan Ie Monnier, a peasant from the Pays de Caux joined 
"band of pillagers who (he claimed) had taken him prisoner. 123 Martin 
Toutain. a butcher from Verneuil took part in a robbery with an 
English yeoman. 124 These and other examples show that there was not 
a clear division between a patriotic French population and the hated 
foreign occupier. 
It has to be understood that pillage was in no wayan element of 
government policy, but was actually opposed and punished by the 
English authorities. Under Bedford's regency, strenuous efforts were 
made to prevent indiscipline. A 'complaints-procedure' was established, 
whereby natives could seek justice if Ihey had been molested by 
Engli sh soldiers, and captains were empowered to punish those 
respon sible. 125 Ordinances were issued in December 1423 and 
September 1428 with the aim of removing the temptation of pillage 
by ensuring that soldiers received regular wages. As the English 
position in France deteriorated following the siege of Orleans in 1429, 
problems of indiscipline increased as the administration's resources 
were stretched by the demands of war. However, the government 
continued its efforts to limit the problem of pillage. A notable pillard 
leader, Venables, was executed in 1434, demonstrating that English 
justice was even-handed. 
In short, it seems that resistance in the countryside, when it 
occurred, mainly took the form of association with brigands or French 
men-at-arms, or of acts of self-defence against attacks by pillagers -
including fellow Frenchmen. In some cases, however. the proximity 
of French armies could act as a catalyst for revolt. The number of 
incidents at the time of the battle of Verneuil are an example of this. 
There is some evidence of pro-Valois sentiment in these incidents. The 
people of Vemeuil opened their town's gates to the French annies, and 
a number of remissions relate to individuals, or small groups, who 
attacked English soldiers. It is, of course, possible that robbery may 
I 124 Evans 
have been the motive. for such attack; in onc case, an English esq . 
was involved in an attack on English fugitives. 126 He claimed to h
U1re 
aVe 
been forced to do so by a group of brigands, suggesting that th 
patriotism of the latter did not extend to excluding the English fro e 
some of their activities. The turmoil of battles and sieges provided ~ 
excellent opportunity for robbery, especially of defeated a"~ 
demoralised soldiers. Although the attacks on individual soldiers at 
Vemeuil were all against Englishmen (suggesting a patriotic motive) 
theft was also an element in them. A remission was issued in 1433 t~ 
Jehan Hauce, who had commited acts of brigandage during the siege of 
Louviers.127 He could hardly have been a French partisan, as he was a 
'natif du pays de Hollande'''' who had served in the English anny. 
To summarise, patriotism played a part, but only a relatively minor 
one, in peasant resi stance. Self-defence of the peasant community was 
the motivation behind most acts of resistance, which could be directed 
against pillagers of either army, or even against native brigands, as 
much as against the En"gli sh authorities. Robbery , rather than 
patriotism. was the main factor in brigand raids. Where conflicts with 
the English did occur, it was often motivated by self-defence Or a 
personal dispute. 
Should we be surprised to find patriotism taking such a minor 
position? There is certainly evidence of tension between the native 
population and the English soldiery. Jehan de Riant , a smith, received 
a remission after killing an Englishman in a fight. 129 The Englishman 
had insulted him, say ing 'parle anglois; tu scez bien parler anglois'.I3O 
Such incidents, and the Englishman's use of the diminutive tu toward 
the Frenchman, point to such a tension. This would be a natural 
product of the problems inherent in the presence of a foreign army for 
a long period of time. Anti-soldier feeling could be very powerful 
among the peasantry, even where the soldiers concerned were not from 
a foreign country. For instance, the Jacquerie began with attacks on 
soldiersYH The English authorities attempted to reduce such tensions, 
for example by not using a system of forced billeting. Neverthless, the 
presence of the army, and the problem of pillage, created problems and 
upset the equilibrium of the peasant community. Occasionally, French 
people came into conflict with English soldiers by voicing anti-
English sentiments. as in the example of Robin Ie Peietier, who was 
killed by an Englishman who heard him insult the duke of Bedford. '32 
However, there were also many instances of French co-operation 
with the English authorities. One remission relates to an incident 
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ring an expedition mounted by the villagers of Dangu and Vesly 
du ,'nst Inoz adversaires,' a band of French soldiers who had stolen the J".:t 
=-ople's horses and cattle. 133 For many, personal safety came before 
~triotiSm; in 1427. one Estienne Drouyn helped a group of English 
Pillagers rob his neighbour in revenge for the latter having denounced 
~im to the French for collaboration.! 34 Such personal quarrels could 
lay as great a role as considerations of loyalty in deciding which side ~ person might choose. 
In effect, there was not a clear and absolute French-English divide. 
r Those who fled Normandy during the conquest were given the 
I opportunity to return by the Caen ordinance of 1423, whereby the 
Bedford government offered them pardons. The policy of the English 
oovernment was, in fact, to respect local rights and customs. The 
~rinciple of respect for local laws was to be extended to the kingdom 
as a whole; in the treaty of Troyes in 1420. Henry V was made heir to 
Charles VI, and promi sed to rule France as a separate kingdom under 
its own laws. In Normandy, Lancastrian rule appealed to regional 
identity. This appeal could potentially be very powerful. especially as 
Henry. a Plantagenet. could claim to be the legitimate heir of Rollo. 
Henry V posed as duke of Normandy in 1419 and. according to the 
Brut, was welcomed by the local inhabitants. 135 Normandy was treated 
to some degree as a separate entity; in the treaty of Troyes, it was to 
be held separately from France by Henry. until he or his he irs came to 
the throne. The Norman Estates were revived and used by the English 
administration, as part of an attempt to make the wars self-financing 
by placing more of the tax-burden onto the shoulders of the Norman 
people. 
This attempted self-sufficiency of defence extended to the use of the 
native population in arms. We have already seen how the peasantry 
was organised against brigands and pillagers following an ordinance of 
January 1434. The local popula!ion also contributed to the English 
armies, as in the example of the mounted 'anglois et normans', one of 
whose number attacked Richart des Hayes in 1426.' ]6 The English 
were, however, careful at times to limit the number of Frenchmen in 
their armies. Feudal levies and urban militias took part in English 
campaigns. although they generally formed a small minority. The 
towns contributed to their own defence through the payment of guet 
and garde. 137 
The picture we perceive is therefore one of considerable loyalty to, 
or at least toleration of. Engli sh rule. especially during the relatively 
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peaceful and prosperous 1420s. Basin described how in the early years 
of Bedford's rule, 'Nonnans and French of that (English-controlled) pa " 
of the kingdom had a great affection for him.1311 These reserves o~ 
loyalty toward the English government dissipated as taxation and 
pillage increased the burden of occupation on the peasantry, until they 
were prepared to revolt. This raises a further question ~ to what extent 
were economic factors a cause of revolt? 
The period of war and occupation placed a heavy burden On an 
economy that was barely recovering from the disasters of plague and 
war in the Fourteenth century. The severe reduction of the popUlation 
following the Black Death had also created the potential for great 
social changes and class struggles as the numerically much reduced 
peasantry became wealthier and morc assertive. Perhaps the emergence 
of the brigands, and the revolt in the Caux should be seen as incidents 
of struggle sparked off by the impact of war and taxation, similar to 
the Jacquerie of 1358 and the English revolt of 1381. 
The early impact of war on its resumption was severe. The years 
1415 and 141 7-19 saw Henry V wage a war of conquest. The war 
seems to have left Nonnandy in a state of some desolation, especially 
in the countryside. Bois calculates that the population in 1422-3 was 
barely half that of 1400. '39 Basin (admittedly a rather distant and Over-
dramatic witness) desc ribed a countryside 'absolutely deserted, 
unculti vated, devoid of inhabitants, covered with brambles and 
briars'.14o This situation was made worse by the failure of the harvests 
of 1420 and 1421 , and inflation caused by the lack of bullion and 
subsequent debasements. Pierre Cachon recorded the social effects; 'cex 
qui vouloient estres riches vindres povres, et les povres riches'.'41 It 
seems highly probable that the phenomenon of the brigands was a 
product of this grave crisis. 
There was some recovery with the improvement in the harvests 
from 1422 onwards, and with the English victory at Verneuil in 1424 
which removed the 'front line' to the Loire. The size of the English 
garrisons halved between 1422-3 and 1428_9.'42 Similarly, the burden 
of taxation fell from the 400,000 Iivres tournois voted in 1421 to a 
mere 120,000 in 1426. 143 There is also evidence of an increase in trade 
and of a return to Normandy, reflected in the large numbers of 
remissions issued in these years. However, what Bois describes as a 
'difficult recovery' l44 faltered toward the end of the decade. The victories 
of Jeanne d'Arc brought new Valois incursions into Normandy. 
Inflation and taxation began to bite again, and commerce declined. 
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,alion rose to over 400,000 livres (ournois once morc in 1431. ]45 In 
;;di tiOn, the population suffered pillage as military discipline declined 
d {he number of garrison troops increased. 
an Th is new economic cris is forms the background to the risings of 
the mid-1430s, as high taxation and the constant problem of pillage 
nd banditry pushed the peasantry to revolt. Taxation was often a 
',Wlyst for revolt, and the faille of 1431 probably fell most heavily 
:pon the .rcasantry, 146 The rising in the, grain-producing Caux region 
in turn hit the Norman economy, as did the entry of French troops 
into the area, and the English reaction 10 the rising. Bois calls the 
consequent situation 'Hiroshima in Normandy" , 147 
The background against which this vast social 
crisis unfolded was once again that of a rural 
economy under the burden of taxation. The 
occupying power met increased resistance with force, 
consequently increasing taxation to finance it ... 
When taxes no longer came in ... the whole political 
and military system was in peril, and pillage proper 
replaced legal pillage. 
Conclusion 
The incidence of brigandage and popular revolt should not be seen 
primarily as a patriotic resistance movement. While it is true that 
there was an element of anti-English feeling in the activities of 
brigands, as in the peasant revolts, this does not appear to have been 
the major factor. Nor was there any element of messianism or religion 
in these movements; there is no reference to religious motives, or to 
support for Jeanne d'Arc in the evidence provided by the remissions. 
Where antipathy to the English occurred, it seems to have been more 
on the level of resentment at outsiders in the peasant community, and 
at the disruption which accompanied the presence of a standing anny. 
There is, however, a correlation between popular resistance and 
economic difficulties. This is not always a direct correlation; 
brigandage could and did occur in periods of relative prosperity, such as 
the mid-1420s when increased movement of goods and merchants 
offered rich pickings for would-be robbers. However, economic 
disruption and social disruption tended to go together, so that we find 
that brigandage was at its peak at times of crisis, particularly military 
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crisis, such as the years of conquest, the VerneuiI Campaign 
years during and immediately after the Caux rising. The initi~1 ~nd the 
felt for Bedford among the population declined with the in O)alt) 
crea\cd 
economic burden that the occupation placed upon them, panicul 
the rise in taxation and in the incidence of pillage. arl}' 
The movements described drew most of their suPpOrt from h 
common people. It would appear from the evidence of the remis . I e 
h h· . ., f h ,. h SiOn, t a~ ( IS SUppOrl came pnman Y Tom t e peap e Wit a small Stake In 
society, namely small traders, craftsmen of low status or arti sans. and 
the poorer peasantry. These were not the absolutely poorest sect io
n
\ 
but those with a small amount of property which was put al risk b' 
the uncertainties of war. The heads of the peasant communitities. th~ 
dizainiers, formed the leadership of the rebels in the Caux, whi le the 
brigands seem to have been led by former soldiers of peasant origins. 
In both cases, the movements seem to have had the character of 
spontaneous activities of t~e lower classes. 
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